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Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: 
An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures 
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel 
I. Introduction 
Specialization is a predominant feature of informed decision-making in collective bodies. 
Alternatives are often initially evaluated by standing committees comprised of subsets of 
the membership. Committee members may have prior knowledge about policies in the 
committee's jurisdiction or may develop expertise on an ongoing basis. Specialization by 
committees can be an efficient way for the parent body to obtain costly information about 
the consequences of alternative policies. Indeed, some scholars have argued persuasively 
that acquisition of information is the raison d'etre for legislative committees (Cooper). 
In most collective decision-making bodies, the relationship between a committee and 
the parent body is governed by a complex array of procedures. A common feature of such 
procedures is that they restrict the ability of the parent body to amend committee propos­
als. In the U.S .  House of Representatives, for example, the capacity for employing restrictive 
amendment procedures accelerated abruptly in the late 19th Century. The Speaker some­
times used his powers of recognition to suppress amendments to committee proposals. The 
standing rules of the House were often suspended temporarily and replaced by a procedure 
that precluded amendments to committee proposals. And the regular order of business 
was often set aside via special orders that specified precise, and often restrictive, conditions 
under which committee proposals could be debated and amended. These and other forms 
of restrictive procedures are frequently employed in contemporary legislatures as well. 
The prevalence of procedures that restrict the ability of the parent body to amend its 
committees' proposals is puzzling because the procedures themselves are normally subject 
to parent body approval. For example, Section 1, Article IV of the U.S .  Constitution states 
that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings," and the exercise of this right 
is theoretically subject to simple majority rule. Why, then, would the parent body agree 
to procedures that may ultimately restrict its ability to amend committee proposals? Why 
and under what conditions would a majority commit to a process that appears to limit its 
influence on legislative policy? 
The thesis of this paper is that restrictions on the ability of a parent body to amend 
committee proposals can enhance the informational role of committees. More precisely, 
restrictive procedures can encourage committees to gather information and can facilitate 
the adoption of informed policies that are jointly beneficial to the committee and parent 
body. Thus, acting in its self-interest, the parent body often restricts its ability to amend 
committee proposals. 
The motivation for studying restrictive procedures in light of the informational role 
of committees comes from studies of congressional decision-making that stress the infor­
mational advantage gained by expert committees over their parent body (Cooper, Fenno, 
MacNeil). Committees that possess expertise about the consequences of alternative policies 
within their jurisdiction often have an incentive to use their special information strategically. 
In his study of the House Appropriations Committee, for example, Fenno (1966) writes that 
"subcommittee specialists have a more informed understanding of the subject matter than 
anyone else," and he quotes members who refer to chairmen's "vast storehouse of infor­
mation" obtained from "digging out the facts" (440-1). Yet it is evident that expertise 
can be a double-edged sword from the perspective of a parent body that is informationally 
disadvantaged. Fenno continues: 
Not only is specialized knowledge a key norm of the House, but appropria­
tions subcommittee chairmen are frequently found among those Members 
with the most·outstanding reputations for expertise . . . Where this is true, 
their reputation constitutes a strategic asset which can be manipulated on 
the floor (emphasis added).  
Specialization, then, can trigger an unfortunate sequence of actions. If committee members' 
preferences for a particular policy outcome differ from those of the parent body, the parent 
body's recognition of the incentives �or strategic use of expertise may cause it to reject or 
amend proposals of the committee. This behavior, however, undermines the incentive for 
the committee to specialize, because the committee realizes that its acquired expertise has 
little bearing on the adoption of the legislative policy. Ultimately, both the committee and 
the parent body may suffer. The committee is deprived of the opportunity to influence 
policy, and the parent body makes uninformed decisions. Thus, the benefits a parent body 
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may derive in principle from specialization of its committees may not be attainable in 
practice. 
This study employs a model to illustrate the effects of restrictive procedures in a collec­
tive decision-making body in which committees may specialize. Actors in the model initially 
are uncertain about the consequences of alternative policies but have common probabilistic 
beliefs about the relationship between policies and their consequences. Given this uncer­
tainty, a committee and a parent body engage in a sequence of actions culminating in the 
selection of a policy. Parent body actions include selection of unrestrictive or restrictive pro­
cedures and selection of final policies. Committee actions include deciding whether or not to 
specialize and proposal of a bill to the parent body. Committee specialization is represented 
as the acquisition of information by the committee that reveals the exact consequences of 
policies prior to their adoption. The committee's decision of whether to specialize in this 
manner is observed by the parent body, but the actual information gained is initially known 
only to the committee. In equilibrium, the behavior of the committee and the parent body 
maximizes their expected utilities based on their beliefs about the likely consequences of 
the policy alternatives. 
Theoretical results are first derived for two amendment procedures and then for the 
parent body's choice of procedure. In the unrestrictive procedure, pu, the parent body may
select any alternative to the committee's proposal. Sometimes called an open rule, this 
procedure characterizes many deliberative and democratic collective choice institutions. 
The unrestricted ability of the parent body to amend committee proposals under pu often
undermines informed decision-making by the parent body in two ways. First, a rational
committee makes proposals that cause the parent body to make imprecise inferences about. 
the relationship between policies and their consequences. Although this strategy maximizes 
the committee's ability to obtain outcomes it prefers, it frequently results in the adoption 
of a policy for which other alternatives are jointly beneficial to the parent body and the 
committee. Second, because only limited inferences are possible, the parent body often 
makes its final decision under substantial uncertainty and the committee's expected rewards 
from specialization are minimal. Thus, the committee frequently chooses not to acquire 
information relevant for the policy process, even though such information would benefit the 
parent body. 
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The restrictive procedure, pr, prohibits the parent body from amending the committee's
proposal. Thus, its choice is between the proposal, as reported by the committee, and 
the status quo. This procedure is sometimes called a closed rule. The inability of the
parent body to amend committee proposals under pr often enhances the ability of the
collective body to derive benefits from committee specialization. First, the parent body 
can make more precise inferences about the committee's private information and use the 
information in its selection of jointly beneficial policies. Second, because the committee has 
more influence on policy, it also has a greater incentive to obtain information. Thus, relative 
to pu, pr enhances the informational role of committees in collective decision-making. 
Restrictive procedures sometimes entail distributional benefits to the committee at the 
expense of_ the parent body. However, the informational benefits associated with restrictive 
procedures often offset the distributional losses to the parent body. Hence, the main result 
of the model: the parent body chooses to employ restrictive procedures for a wide range of 
the exogenous variables of the model. As long as the preferences of the committee and the 
parent body are not extremely divergent and the costs of committee specialization are not 
prohibitive, the parent body benefits from limiting its ability to amend committee proposals. 
Although the focus of the paper is on procedural solutions to problems posed by 
decision-making under uncertainty, the model also has implications for other institutional 
devices for inducing specialization and informed decision-making. In some cases the in­
formational role of committees can be enhanced by altering committee assignments rather 
that by restricting amendments. For example, under either amendment procedure, as the 
preferences of the committee and parent body converge, the committee becomes increas­
ingly likely to acquire information that the parent body can use in its final policy sel�ction. 
Similarly, lowering the cost the committee must incur to obtain expertise has the obvious 
effect of stimulating the gathering of information by the committee and the less obvious 
effect of stimulating the mutually beneficial use of information by the committee and parent 
body. 
Section II documents the development of restrictive procedures in the U .S .  House of 
Representatives in the last several decades of the 19th century and poses the puzzle of why a 
collective decision-making body would adopt restrictive amendment procedures. Section III 
introduces a model of collective decision-making with standing committees in which actors 
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are uncertain about the relationship between policies and their consequences. Section IV 
contains an analysis of the properties of the model for unrestrictive amendment procedures 
while Section V examines the same model for restrictive procedures. Section VI identifies 
the conditions under which restrictive procedures are preferred by the parent body, thus 
exposing the informational rationale for restrictive procedures. Section VII is a discussion, 
and Section VIII is a summary. 
II. Examp les of Restrictive Procedures: The 19th Century Congress 
The House once debated; now it does not debate. It has not the time.
There would be too many debates, and there are too many subjects to
debate. It is a business body, and it must get its business done (Wilson,
1907). 
A historical analysis of the U.S. House of Representatives in the late 19th century illus­
trates several methods of restrictive amendment procedures and provides a concrete context 
in which to pose the institutional puzzle addressed in the remainder of the paper. Three 
classes of restrictive procedures are recognition precedents, suspension of the rules, and 
special orders reported by the Committee on Rules. Since approximately 1870, the House 
has exhibited the ability to commit to the selective use of these procedural arrangements. 
Recognition 
For orderly conduct of business, any collective body needs procedures that govern who 
may make motions and when various types of motions are in order. Typically, the associated 
powers of recognition are vested in the presiding officer(s) of the body, for example, the 
Speaker of the House, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, or President pro
tempore of the Senate.
Prior to the 1870s several recognition precedents were set, but few of them had major 
implications for restrictiveness of House procedure. The Speaker's power of recognitio�
was initially prescribed by Jefferson's Manual, which governs House procedure whenever it
does not conflict with the House's standing rules (Hinds: V, 6757). 1 The early standing 
1 Citations to Hinds without a volume number refer to the 1899 work, Parliamentary
Precedents of the House of Representatives in the United States. Citations with a volume 
number refer to the five volume set published in 1907. In each case, precedent numbers 
rather than page numbers are provided. 
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rule on recognition seems to have been of minimal strategic significance,2 but in the 1840s 
precedents began to establish more discriminating criteria for recognition. For example, 
preferential treatment to members of the reporting committee was granted by precedent 
as early as 1843 (Hinds: 69), and precedence of motions to be offered became a criterion 
for recognition by 1851 (Hinds: II, 1422). At least until 1857, however, the Speaker's 
recognition decision was subject to appeal. Indeed, in most key recognition precedents the 
decision of the chair was appealed (Hinds: 65, 66, 69). 
By the late 1870s concentration of recognition rights in the Speaker was well underway, 
and increasingly the Speaker used recognition powers to regulate the conduct of business. 
In 1879 the House accepted a Rules Committee report clarifying the Speaker's recognition 
powers. The report clearly indicates that recognition had come to be (and was accepted as 
being) .a discretionary, hence potentially restrictive, tool. 
. . .  discretion must be lodged with the presiding officer, and no fixed and 
arbitrary order of recognition can be wisely provided for in advance . .  . 
The practice of making a list of those who desire to speak on measures . .  . 
is a proper one to know and remember the wishes of Members. As to 
the order of recognition, he should not be bound to follow the list, but
should be free to exercise a wise and just discretion in the interest of full 
and fair debate ( Hinds: 63, emphasis added). 
Recognition powers were further strengthened two years later when Speaker Randall de­
clined appeal on the question of recognition, stating that "the right of recognition is just as 
absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is to the 
interpretation of the law" (Hinds: II, 1425). Speaker Keifer affirmed the new precedent in 
1883 ( Hinds: II, 1426). 
Throughout the 1880s and into the 1890s, recognition precedents increasingly favored 
bill-supporting committee majorities by restricting the opportunities for others to be rec­
ognized. An 1886 precedent gave preference to the supporter of a bill from the committee 
over that committee's chairman because the chairman opposed the bill ( Hinds: 71) .  An 
1889 precedent gave preference to the bill manager from the committee over other members 
who wished to make motions of greater privilege (Hinds: 74).3 
2 Section 2 of Rule XIV, adopted in the first session of the 1st Congress, stated that 
"When two or more Members rise at once, the Speaker shall name the Member who is first 
to speak" ( Hinds: 61 ) .  
3 This precedent was generalized in  1892 when Speaker Crisp ruled that "neither a motion 
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By the turn of the century, recognition powers were not only well-established but also 
explicitly used for control of business via denying recognition to members whose motions
were not known to or not favored by the Speaker. By 1897 it was possible that "the 
Speaker may, under certain circumstances, prefer another Member to one who is already on 
the floor" ( Hinds: 68) . 4  Evidence of the willingness of Speakers to use recognition precedents 
to restrict debate and amendments is provided by the Speakers themselves. In 1900, for 
example, Representative Sulzer claimed recognition and Speaker Henderson ruled that "the 
gentleman was not recognized, and the Chair may as well state that the Chair will recognize 
no gentleman unless he has some knowledge of what is going to be called up" (Chiu: 169). 
Similarly, in 1904 Speaker Cannon replied as follows to a member who was deprived of 
recognition: 
The present occupant of the Chair, the Speaker of the House, follows 
the usual rule that has been obtained ever since he has been a member 
of the House, that the Chair chooses whom he will recognize. . . .  Other 
things being even or anything near even, if there be a question, under 
present conditions, in the closing hours, the Chair has a perfect right . . .
to prefer some one with whom, perchance, the Chair is in sympathy, or 
upon the Chair's side of the House ( quoted in Chiu: 172). 
Suspension of the Rules 
Orderly conduct of business can be facilitated by recognition procedures. But collective 
decision-making bodies typically also have standing rules that determine a "regular order of 
business." Moreover, in spite of the control that may be afforded by recognition procedures, 
members often find it convenient to deviate from the regular order. Under the standing 
rules of the House, for example, bills are considered in the order in which they are reported 
to lay on the table nor a motion to adjourn or to take a recess, all of which are highly 
privileged motions, can take off the floor a gentleman who has the floor" (Hinds: 77). 
Historians often credit Speaker Reed for bringing an otherwise unruly House under control 
by "counting the quorum" in 1891 (W. Robinson; McCall). The twin irony is that ( 1 )  Reed 
raised and was overruled on this point of order which sought to undermine the Speaker's 
control via recognition, and (2) Crisp, who overruled Reed, was Reed's principal opponent 
in the quorum counting battles of the previous Congress. 
The precedents were not perfunctorily pro-committee, however. In 1892 the speaker pro
tempore ruled that rights to recognition shall alternate between proponents and opponents 
of a bill, even if it is necessary to go outside the committee to find opponents (Hinds: 72). 
4 Representative McMillin was recognized for a parliamentary inquiry, was informed 
that a motion to suspend the rules was in order, and "announced his desire to suspend the 
rules," whereupon Representative Dingley sought recognition, attained it, and moved that 
the House adjourn. The House adjourned. 
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from committees. This simple procedure precludes giving high priority t.o important bills 
if, for example, they happen to have been reported relatively late due to the extraordinary 
work required to draft complex legislation in committee. 
From the early Congresses, the House addressed the problem of rigidity in its standing 
rules under the auspices of its Constitutional authority to determine the rules of its pro­
ceedings. The procedure it used was suspension of the rules. The suspension procedure has 
a history of diverse applications, with the nature and extent of its use determined largely 
by other procedures at the disposal of the parent chamber at a given time.5 For the present 
discussion, generalizations about the use of the procedure in two periods are useful: before 
and after the 1870s. 
Prior to the 1870s the typical uses of the suspension procedure were to change standing 
rules or to deviate from the regular order of business via two-thirds vote. Early constraints 
on the use of the suspension procedure were minimal, requiring only that the House receive 
one day's notice prior to offering a motion to change or rescind a standing rule or order of 
the House. Precedents in the 1820s established what had by then become common practice. 
In 1822 the standing rule providing for suspension of the rules was changed to require a 
two-thirds vote of members present.6 In 1828 the procedure was explicitly linked to the 
order of business (Hinds: V, 6790).  For several decades, suspension served as a convenient 
instrument for deviating from the regular order by providing for special consideration of bills. 
Although suspension sometimes also specified conditions for debate, bills that were brought 
to the floor via suspension were normally debated freely and were open to amendment as 
specified by the standing rules (Hinds, V, 5856). 
Beginning in the late 1860s, suspension became more restrictive in terms of permissible 
amendments to legislation. In 1868, for example, it became "possible by one motion both 
to bring a matter before the House and pass it under suspension of the rules" ( Hinds: V, 
6846).7 In 1876 a precedent established that "the rules may be suspended by a single motion 
and vote, so as to permit the House to vote first on a specified amendment to a bill and 
5 For more thorough historical accounts, see Hinds (V,  Ch. CXLII) and Bach ( 1986). 
6 Except for unusual circumstances in the Fifty-first Congress, suspension of the rules
has always required a two-thirds vote (Hinds: V, 6970, p .  903). 
7 The case was "a resolution providing a special order for considering the impeachment 
of Andrew Johnson" (Ibid.) .
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then on the bill itself" (Hinds: V, 6851) .  And in each of the following three years, major 
bills were passed under suspension motions that not only restricted amendments but also 
permitted no debate. A leading authority on congressional procedure speculates that "it 
certainly seems likely that bills of such importance were passed under suspension of the 
rules in order to preclude debate and amendment, not simply in order to expedite business" 
(Bach: 56). 
Use of suspension for restrictive purposes continued after changes in the standing rules 
in 1880 which, among other things, set aside two Mondays per month for suspension mo­
tions. The revised procedures favored committees by designating one day as committee 
suspension day.8 A decade later two rulings by Speaker Reed strengthened committees' use 
of suspension. The first protected committees from jurisdictional infringement by requiring 
that when a committee offers a motion to suspend the rules to consider a bill, the bill must 
have been referred to that committee. The second stipulated that a member offering a 
suspension motion on behalf of a committee must have received formal authorization from 
the committee (Bach: 24). 
Application of the suspension procedure to restrict debate and amendments was also 
augmented by the Speaker's recognition powers. Hinds explains that during early Con­
gresses, when "the Speaker was compelled to recognize any Member who first got his atten­
tion on the motion to suspend the rules" the suspension procedure was "greatly abused." 
Individuals would propose to bring up special interest bills about which other members were 
often ignorant. "To prevent this snare" the House frequently adjourned when suspension 
motions were offered (Hinds quoted in Chiu: 199). Later in the century when stronger 
recognition powers had been established, however, the suspension procedure could be ap­
plied selectively9 and with increasing restrictiveness. After 1880, into the 20th Century, and 
8 "Although the distinction remained until 1973, it came to have little significance, as 
the expectation became firmly established that most measures considered under suspen­
sion would first have been reported from committee" (Bach: 24-5). Also, the suspension 
procedure in practice sometimes conferred disproportionate procedural benefits to standing 
comrrlittees even before 1880. In 1856 and 1857, for example, precedents were established 
"to suspend the rules to enable one or several bills to be reported from committees and at 
the same time to be considered in the House" (Hinds: 1592).  
9 For example, Speaker Crisp ruled in 1893 that: "The Chair fully appreciates the fact 
that according to the practice which has always prevailed the motion to suspend the rules 
has been one depending on recognition; that is, it can not be made unless the Member is 
recognized to make it .  The Chair, in speaking of this motion as one of the highest privilege, 
9 
at present, the procedure can effectively preclude all amendments to a measure. On a typ­
ical motion to suspend the rules, a single two-thirds vote has the effect both of suspending 
the rules and of passing the motion unamended. 10 
Special Orders and the Committee on Rules 
All collective decision-making bodies have recognition procedures; most have proce­
dures establishing a regular order of business; and some have procedures for deviating from 
the regular order. The House of Repre�entatives has used all of these procedures with 
varying degrees of restrictiveness. Since the creation of the Rules Committee as a perma­
nent standing committee in 1880, it also has employed a mechanism for proposing special
procedures for specific bills. The mechanism is the "special order," and its history is ·consis-
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tent with the thesis of this section. Congressional rules exhibited a capacity for assigning 
increasingly restrictive special orders beginning in the 1870s. 
From the first day of the first Congress, the Rules Committee. has been the initiator 
in changes to the House's standing rules . Prior to the 1870s, however, its role in day-to­
day proceedings was usually minor. In all but two Congresses between 1 789 and 1880 the 
Committee on Rules was merely a select committee authorized at the beginning of each 
Congress to report a system of standing rules ( Hinds: IV, 4321 ) .  Nevertheless, harbingers 
of a Rules Committee with a capacity for proposing restrictive consideration of legislation 
can be found prior to 1880. In 1841 a precedent was established that became the basis for 
the Rules Committee issuing bill-specific resolutions at any time (Hinds: 1538). In 1850 the 
Committee was given exclusive jurisdiction over reports to change the rules (Hinds: 1540) . 11
In 1853 the Speaker ruled that a report from the Rules Committee must be acted on until 
disposed of, thus giving such reports precedence over the regular order ( Chiu: 1 18). In 
did not mean to convey the idea that necessarily when the day comes for motions to suspend 
the rules the chair must recognize a gentleman to make such a motion (Chiu: 200). 
IO The motion may include amendments, but this is only superficially nonrestrictive. For
example, a member may move to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 999 with amendments as 
reported by the Committee on Ways and Means. But because the amendments referred to 
in the motion are not subject to futher amendment, the vote on the motion is tantamount to 
a two-thirds majority, take-it-or-leave-it vote on the bill with the committee amendments. 
(Such amendments typically originate from the committee with jurisdiction over the bill 
( Oleszek: 101) ). 
1 1 The significance of this precedent requires several qualifications. The Committee did 
not yet have standing status, reports to change rules still required a two-thirds vote, and 
the suspension procedure was still often available to members without prior reference to the 
Rules Committee. 
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1859 the Speaker was made ex officio Chairman of the Committee (Alexander: 193). And
by the 1870s, House members had adopted the practice of referring resolutions to change 
the rules to the Rules Committee (Hinds: IV, 6790).12 Although of questionable individual 
significance, these precedents collectively became the basis for the ensuing "era of the special 
order" (Atkinson: Ch. 5). 
The distinct catalyst was the rules changes of 1880 which, not coincidentally, were 
drafted and proposed by the Rules Committee. The result was increasing use of bill-specific
special orders.13 Like previous applications of suspension of the rules, special orders en­
abled deviation from the regular order of business to consider specified bills. But special 
orders differed from suspension of the rules in two irnporta�t respects. First, after 1883 
a simple majority rather than two-thirds majority could adopt a special order (Hinds IV, 
3152).14 Second, because the permanent standing Rules Committee assumed the role of 
screening bills for legislative consideration, special orders became more flexibly applied than 
suspension of the rules in their imposition of restrictions on amendments to bills. Thus, 
after 1880 "the use of the motion to suspend the rules has gradually been restricted, while 
the functions of the Committee on Rules have been enlarged" (Hinds: IV, 6790). 
Hinds ' Precedents contains several pages of examples of special orders that provided for 
consideration of bills with varying degrees of restrictiveness. Restrictions come in two forms: 
time allotted for consideration of bills and amendments permitted on such bills. Special 
orders on the open end of the continuum include resolutions providing for consideration 
of bills amended by a substitute from the reporting committee but wher� the committee 
12 Hinds writes that this practice had already begun as early as 1842 and concludes: 
"Gradually the Committee on Rules was intrusted with all amendments [to the rules], the 
end of the old system corning formally with a ruling ma.de in 1887" Ibid.
13 Special orders are now often referred to as special rules (Bach: 1981). 
14 The literature is not entirely consistent on the question of when majority-approved 
special orders began to be used regularly. Hinds (V, 6775) states that "In 1875 the function 
of the Committee on Rules in reporting rules for special purposes was so little used that 
there was doubt as to its validity without a two-thirds vote." And in his introductory 
remarks to the chapter on special orders he writes that after the method of adopting a 
special order by majority vote was used in 1883, "This method was not in great favor in 
the next three Congresses." Alexander, however, reports that "[after] the Rules Committee 
reported during the Forty-eighth Congress [1883-1885] three special orders which a majority 
adopted, the procedure grew slowly in favor. In the Forty-ninth Congress, ... Carlisle not 
only used it more freely, but added greatly to the Rules Committee's prestige by extending 
its jurisdiction to the order of business. After the gift of this high privilege, the House, 
accustomed to parliamentary surprises, stood aghast when the Committee, in a single special 
order, adopted by a majority, fixed the order of business for sixteen legislative days" (205). 
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substitute is open to amendment (Hinds: IV, 3238, 3239, 3241). Slightly more restrictive 
procedures were provided for in a special order that permitted offering of two substitutes 
but limited the time for amendments and limited the total time for consideration of the 
bill (Hinds: IV, 3229). A still more restrictive procedure was provided for in a special 
order that permitted only amendments that were listed in the special order (Hinds: IV, 
3235).15 In a similar special order, the permissible amendments were those recommended 
by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which had jurisdiction over the 
bill in question (Hinds: IV, 3233). Finally, several special orders not only restricted time 
for consideration of legislation but also prohibited amendments entirely (Hinds: IV, 3231, 
3234, 3236).16 
Beginning in the 1880s special orders were also used often for considering bundles of bills 
and for resolving bicameral differences. But the key feature of special orders in the context of 
the present discussion is their capacity for restricting opportunities of the parent chamber to 
amend legislation reported by its standing committees. Consistent with the historical trends 
in recognition powers and suspension of the rules, procedural restrictiveness had became not 
only possible but also common by the last three decades of the 19th Century. Furthermore, 
the institutional mechanisms whereby the parent chamber constrains its behavior have 
persisted and are central to the proceedings of the contemporary Congress as well. 
The Puzzle of Restrictive Procedures 
The historical discussion illustrates several procedural mechanisms that can protect 
committee proposals from amendments on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
A .key characteristic of these mechanisms is that they constitute selective commitments by 
the parent chamber to limit its ability to amend committee proposals. The credibility of 
these commitments is enhanced through delegation of procedural powers to a third party. In 
the House, for example, recipients of such powers include the Speaker, the Rules Committee, 
and party leaders, all of whom can greatly facilitate the application of restrictive procedures. 
15 Today this would be called a modified-closed rule. 
16 Today these would be called gag rules or closed rules. 
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The historical discussion also raises two important questions. The first question is 
specific. Why did restrictive procedures emerge in the 19th Century House? The second 
question is generic to collective decision-making characterized by majority rule, division of 
labor, specialization, and procedural complexity. Why and when would a parent chamber 
commit to the use of procedures that appear to limit its influence on the selection of policies? 
This question is particularly perplexing when it is recognized that the mechanisms for 
applying restrictive procedures are subject to the periodic approval of the parent body. We 
return to the specific question in Section VII after presenting a model that uncovers the 
more general rationale for restrictive procedures in collective decision-making bodies with 
standing committees. 
III. Collective Decision-Making with Standing Committees 
This section introduces a game-theoretic model for examining the motivations for and 
effects of unrestrictive and restrictive amendment procedures. The model has three unique 
and key assumptions: (1) the parent body determines whether an unrestrictive or restrictive 
procedure governs consideration of a committee's proposal, (2) actors are uncertain about 
the consequences of various policies, and (3) a standing committee can acquire private infor­
mation or "expertise" about the consequences of policies by incurring a cost. The analysis 
takes as given the centrality of committees in collective decision-making and illustrates 
formally the informational role of committees in a multi-stage choice process. 
Policies and Consequences 
Unlike all extant models of committee-parent, body decision-making, this model views 
policies (or laws) and consequences (or outcomes) as fundamentally distinct and assumes 
that the consequences of policy are not known with certainty.17 Of course, not all collective 
17 See, however, Austen-Smith and Riker for a model that makes a similar distinction 
between policies and consequences but focuses on costless private information within a 
single committee rather than costly information for a committee acting within a larger, 
multi-stage institution. 
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choice is characterized by uncertainty. But policies are often new, untried, and subject to 
the vicissitudes of implementation. For example, legislation is always subject to judicial 
interpretation which may be at variance with legislative intent, or administrators may ex­
ecute laws inconsistent with legislative preferences when preferences are heterogeneous or 
when legislative oversight is imperfect. Similarly, the political or economic environment in 
which policy consequences are realized may be subject to random variation beyond the im-
mediate control of political decision-makers. For example, macroeconomic conditions affect 
federal revenues for any given tax policy, international events affect national security for a 
given level of defense spending, and weather affects the crop yields and hence the costs and 
benefits of agriculture policy. 
The formal assumption that incorporates uncertainty is that there is a stochastic and 
linear relationship between a policy and its consequences. This relationship is given by x = 
p+w, where x is the consequence or outcome of the policy, pis a policy in a unidimensional 
space P C n 1, and w is a random variable uniformly distributed in (0, 1] with mean w 
and variance u�.18 Thus, when the game begins, decision-makers do not know the exact 
consequences of various policies. Nor do they know this during the game unless they know 
or can make inferences about the value of the random variable. 
Players and Preferences 
The legislative policy results from a sequence of decisions by two actors, a committee 
and parent chamber majority. For brevity, the parent chamber is referred to as the "floor." 
Each actor's utility is expressed, in part, as the negative of the squared deviation of the 
policy consequence, x, from the actor's most preferred policy consequence or "ideal point." 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, the ideal points of the floor and committee are 
given by x I = 0 and Xe > O, respectively. With this assumption, Xe represents the absolute
18 The results hold for any finite support (g_, OJ of the uniform distribution. Subsequent 
discussions of the mean and variance of the random variable implicitly refer to this more 
general specification. 
14 
Actors 
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6. Floor 
FIGURE 1 
Stages of the Game Under Alternative 
Information Structures 
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difference between floor and committee ideal points. 
The possibility of specialization in an uncertain policy environment is represented by 
the ability of the committee to determine the exact relationship between policies and con-
sequences. Specifically, by incurring a cost, k, the committee can observe the exact value 
of the random variable, w. If acquired, this value is private information known only to the 
committee. If the committee chooses not to incur the cost to observe w, however, the com-
mittee does not possess an informational advantage on the floor. The committee's decision 
to observe w is represented by the variable s (for "specialization") which takes a value of O
or 1 when the committee does not or does know w, respectively. Although the value of w is 
not public knowledge, the value of s is public knowledge. That is, the floor knows whether 
or not the committee has specialized. 
The floor and committee actors seek to maximize expected utility. Utilities are given 
by u1 and Uc, respectively, where UJ = -(x - x1)2 = -x2 and Uc = -(x - xc)2 - sk.
Structure of the Game 
The interaction between the floor and the committee is represented as a noncooperative 
game under incomplete information. When the game begins, neither the committee nor the 
floor knows w. However, both players know the prior probability density of w, the other 
parameters of the model (xc, Xf and k), the functional form of the relationship between 
policies and outcomes, and the utility functions. Actors take the actions in the order shown 
in Figure 1. 
First, the parent chamber (floor) selects and commits to the use of a procedure. Two 
pure types of amendment procedures are considered. The unrestrictive amendment pro-
cedure, pu, does not limit the floor's ability to alter the bill proposed by the committee.
The floor may choose any policy contained in the set of feasible policies. In a congressional 
setting, this prucedure is often referred to as an open rule. The restrictive amendment
procedure, pr, limits the floor's ability to amend the committee's bill to a choice between 
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the status quo policy and the bill proposed by the committee. This "take-it-or-leave-it" 
procedure is sometimes referred to as a closed rule. Obviously, these two amendment pro­
cedures·do not exhaust the set of procedures discussed in Section II. However, alternative 
procedures may be though of as combinations of the pu and pr processes, and insights 
into more complicated and realistic amendment procedures can be gained by examining the 
characteristics of the pure procedures. 
Second, the committee decides whether to specialize by acquiring information about 
the consequences of policy. If the committee chooses to incur a cost (k)  to obtain private 
information about the random variable (w), then s = 1 and the game continues under
asymmetric information. Th.is choice of s = 1 is alternatively referred to as "specialization"
or "acquiring expertise"19 If the committee does not specialize, however, then s = 0 and 
actors subsequently choose a policy under symmetric uncertainty. These two informational 
situations are represented by the left and right columns in Figure 1. 
Third, an exogenous and nonstrategic player, "nature," determines the exact value 
of the random variable (w) . If the committee did not specialize, the value is concealed. 
If the committee did specialize, the value is revealed only to the committee. Fourth, the 
committee chooses a bill (b) from the set of feasible policies (P) to report to the floor for final
consideration. Fifth, the floor actor updates his beliefs about the consequences of various 
policies. In particular, he knows whether or not the committee specialized (s) but not what 
information the committee acquired (w) if it specialized. He therefore makes inferences 
about the random variable based upon his knowledge of the committee's preferences, his 
observation of the committee's bill, his knowledge of whether the committee has private 
information, and his assumption that the committee behaves rationally. Notice, however, 
that the floor's beliefs change at this stage only if the committee specialized in the previous 
stage, because otherwise no new information is available. Sixth, the floor actor chooses a 
19 Concrete manifestations of this form of specialization include congressional activities 
such as scheduling witnesses, issuing subpoenas to the executive branch for information, 
holding hearings, or allocating staff to study a problem or to draft legislation. 
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policy (p) that is permitted by the amendment procedure. Under the unrestrictive procedure
(P"), any policy (p E P) can be chosen. Under the restrictive procedure (Pr), the floor
must accept either the bill {b) as reported by the committee or an exogenously given status
quo policy (Po)· Finally, the outcome (x) is realized and payoffs are assigned in accordance
with the utility functions. 
Equilibria and Efficiency Criteria 
The major objective of the analysis is to determine the floor's choice of an amendment 
procedure. The three levels of analysis required are sketched in Figure 2. First, equilibria are 
identified for four games in which the procedural decision of the floor and the specialization 
decision of the committee are given. These games are referred to as legislative games and are
denoted {P"ls = O}, {P"ls = 1), {P'ls = 0), and {P'ls = 1). As suggested by the notation,
legislative games take both the procedural and the specialization decisions as given. Second, 
characterizations of the legislative games are used to identify the committee's specialization 
decision. Thus, two expertise games are analyzed, one for each type of procedure, P" and
pr. In an expertise game, the committee unilaterally chooses which of the two possible
legislative games to play under a given procedure. Third and finally, the characteristics of 
the legislative and expertise equilibria are used to determine the solution to the procedural
game in which the floor chooses from {P", pr} to maximize its expected utility given optimal
behavior in the subsequent expertise and legislative games. 
The sketch of the analysis accentuates the need for defining and explaining the equilib­
ri.um and efficiency concepts to be employed. Analysis of the four legislative games employs
a type of sequential or perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This equilibrium satisfies the best 
response property commonly found in games of complete information. In addition, each 
player, according to Bayes' Rule, incorporates information and beliefs about the game into 
his optimal strategy. Each player responds optimally to the strategy choice of the other 
player given his information and updated beliefs. In the current model, the concept of 
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sequential or perfect Bayes equilibrium extends the normal application of Nash equilibrium 
to games with incomplete information. 20 
In the four legislative games with the procedure and specialization decision given, a 
equilibrium must satisfy three conditions. First, given its beliefs about the value of the 
random variable (w) the floor's strategy must be a best response. Based upon the com­
mittee's bill ( b) the floor forms beliefs about the random variable. The strategy it plays
must maximize its expected utility given these beliefs. Second, given the floor's optimal 
response and beliefs, the committee's strategy must be optimal. The floor's beliefs and 
optimal strategy are a function of the committee's bill. The committee's·selection of a bill 
must maximize its expected utility given optimal floor behavior. Third, the floor's beliefs 
must be realized in equilibrium. The rationale for this third condition is simply that, in 
equilibrium, one would not expect the floor to incur losses associated with systematic mis-
perceptions. Thus, the floor's beliefs about the random variable based on the committee's 
bill must be self-confirming. Formally, 
DEFINITION 1. A legislative equilibrium is a set of strategies, p*( - )  and b*( ·) ,  and beliefs,
g*( ·), such that
a. b*(w) maximizes Euc, given p*(b) and g*(b),
b. p*(b) maximizes Eu fl given g*(b), and
c. g*(b) E [O, 1] for a// band g*(b) = {w I b = b*(w)} whenever g*(b) is non-empty.
That is, (a) the committee's strategy maximizes its expected utility given optimal behavior 
of the floor, (b) the floor's strategy maximizes its expected utility given its beliefs about w,
and ( c) the floor's beliefs are consistent with optimal committee behavior and are realized
in equilibrium. 
20 The equilibrium concept used here is identical to those used implicitly by Akerloff and 
by Spence and explicitly by Milgrom and Roberts (1982a,b) and Kreps and Wilson (1982a). 
For a complete survey of this literature, see Fudenberg and Tirole. For a general definition 
of sequential equilibrium, see Kreps and Wilson (1982b ).
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FIGURE 2 
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After analysis of the legislative equilibria for the legislative games, the focus is on 
the expertise games which are distinguished from legislative games by the addition of the 
committee's specialization decision. Given the committee's expectation that actors are 
expected utility maximizers, what is equilibrium behavior with respect to its decision of 
whether to seek policy expertise (i .e. , whether to incur k to observe w)? The answer is a
simple extension of the legislative equilibrium. 
DEFINITION 2. An expertise equilibrium is a set [b*(w), p*(b), g*(b), s•] where s• maxi-
mizes Eue given the legislative equilibrium. 
Notice that while this equilibrium is fundamentally determined by the committee's first­
stage behavior (i .e. , whether to acquire policy expertise), such behavior is conditioned by
the committee's expectations about subsequent committee and floor behavior under a given
procedure. 
A final equilibrium is identified by focusing on the parent chambe� '.s choice of proce­
dures, based on Eu1 under pu or pr, 
DEFINITION 3. A procedural equilibrium is a procedure p• such that 
Thus, based on rational expectations regarding the subsequent expertise and legislative 
games, the floor actor selects the procedure from the set {Pu, pr} that maximizes its 
expected utility. 
The critical dependence of legislative and expertise equilibria on procedure is demon­
strated and explained below. Two criteria are employed to compare the equilibria in the 
legislative and expertise games in the first two levels of analysis. The first facilitates ex post
comparisons of equilibria in the four legislative games and focuses simply on whether the 
realized outcome lies on the contract curve between x f and Xe. This is the conventional
Pareto criterion. 
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DEFINITION 4. A realized outcome, x = p• + w, is Pareto optimal if and only if it lies in
the interval [O, Xe] · 
The second criterion is used to compare the two expertise games and focuses on whether 
the committee's specialization decision maximizes the sum of expected utilities of the two 
actors. In contrast to Pareto optimality, the expertise efficiency criterion is based on ex­
pectations about subsequent behavior of the game rather than on realized outcomes. 
DEFINITION 5. An expertise game is expertise efficient if and only if, in the expertise equi­
librium, EuL(Pl s*) 2: EuL(Pl s1), where Eur,_= Eu1 + Eue and s• I s'.
The analysis of the paper is part normative and part positive. The positive concerns, 
represented by Definitions 1-3, pertain to the actions that rational actors take in the sequen­
tial decision-making setting. The normative concerns, represented by Definitions 4 and 5, 
pertain to whether these actions, ex post or ex ante, yield desirable behavior and outcomes.
Although the normative criteria are useful in highlighting some properties of alternative 
procedures, the rationale for restrictive procedures (summarized in Proposition 7 below) is
a positive, i.e. individually rational, phenomenon. That is, under the conditions specified,
a restrictive procedure is the equilibrium in the procedural game. It does not result simply 
because of its normative properties. 
IV. Unrestrictive Amendment Procedures 
This section identifies legislative equilibria for the two legislative games ({Pul s= 0) and 
{Pul s= 1)) and the expertise equilibrium for the unrestrictive amendment procedure (Pu). 
This procedure allows the floor to choose any policy (p E P) in response to the committee's 
bill (b) .21 The section also presents the expected utilities in the pu games and assesses
Pareto optimality and expertise efficiency. 
21 The committee is not permitted to obstruct legislation by refusing to report a bill.
Thus, an assumption regarding a status quo or reversion point is not required for the 
analysis of P". 
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Unrestrictive Procedures without Committee Expertise 
The legislative equilibrium, expected utilities and optimality properties for (Puls =  0)
are easy to calculate. Since the committee does not specialize ( s = 0 ) , it does not possess
private information regarding the consequences of policy. This is common knowledge. Con­
sequently, the floor disregards the committee's proposal and selects a policy that maximizes 
its expected utility given its prior belief about w. Proposition 1 identifies the legislative 
equilibrium, the Pareto optimality of its realized outcomes, and the floor and committee 
expected utilities for (Pu l s= 0).22
P ROPOSITION 1. For the legislative game (Pul s=O) ,
a . the legislative equilibrium is 
b* E P, 
p*(b) = -w, and
g*(b) = {w I w E [O, 1]} ; and
b. the expected utilities are 
Eu1 (Pu ls = O) = -er� and 
Eue(Pu ls = 0) = -er� - x�; and
c. realized ou tcomes are Pareto optimal if and only if w E [w, Xe + wJ.
Figure 3 depicts the legislative equilibrium and policy consequence for (Pu l s= 0). The
horizontal axis represents the value of the random variable (w) and the floor's beliefs (g*).
The vertical axis represents the committee's proposed bill (b*), the floor's policy choice 
(p* ) ,  and the realized outcome (x). The shaded region reflects the values of proposed bills
consistent with the legislative equilibrium. In the legislative game (Puls = O) , the floor's
beliefs do not depend on the committee's bill because the floor knows that the committee 
possesses no private information. The floor's best response is to maximize its expected 
22 Proofs of propositions are contained in the Appendix.
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utility given its prior knowledge about the distribution of the random variable. This policy 
is p* = x f - w = -w and is shown as the horizontal line at -w. Expectationally, it yields
an outcome at the floor's ideal point, since x = p* + w = 0 = x I. Given the floor's strategy,
the committee's strategy is inconsequential. Realizing that it cannot affect the floor's policy 
choice, the committee proposes any bill, b E P, hence the large shaded region in F igure 3.
Uncertainty about the consequences of policies requires players to incur losses in utility 
as a consequence of the uncertainty about the effects of policies on outcomes. With quadratic 
utility functions, these losses equal negative the variance in the random variable (-er�).23
Proposition lb shows that the higher is this variance, the greater are the losses to both actors 
due to uncertainty. Because the expected outcome of the game is x f = 0, the committee's
expected utility contains another loss term equal to -x� .
The solid diagonal line in F igure 3 represents the realized outcome, which is not Pareto 
optimal for at least half the values of the random variable. Furthermore, the smaller is Xe,
the larger is the range of w for which outcomes are not Pareto optimal.
The simplicity of (Pu l s = 0) illustrates the potential importance of information under
unrestrictive procedures. The committee's proposal is irrelevant to the collective choice 
process whenever the committee does not specialize. Because the floor knows that the 
committee does not possess policy expertise, it ignores the committee's bill. The committee 
therefore plays no informational role in this legislative game. Consequently, both actors 
suffer an informational loss of -er� .  Additionally, the committee suffers a distributional
loss of -x�.
Unrestrictive Procedures with Committee Expertise 
The legislative equilibrium for (Puls = 1) is more complicated and accentuates the 
subtle but fundamental role information plays in multi-stage collective decision-making 
under uncertainty. By definition, when s = 1 the committee knows the value w. Both the
23 Eu1 = Jl -(p + w)2f(w) dw = Jl -(w - w)2f(w) dw = -er�.
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floor and the committee may ben�fit by incorporating this information into the legislative 
choice. For example, suppose the committee reports a bill from which the floor can infer 
the exact value of w. Then the floor would use this information to select a policy that 
maximizes its expected utility. This policy is simply p = x J - w, which would yield the
floor's ideal point with certainty. In this case Eu1 = 0 and Eue = -x� .  Due to the 
elimination of uncertainty, these expected payoffs are greater than those under (Puls = O} 
(see Proposition lb),24 Thus, committee specialization appears to benefit both actors. 
However, in this legislative game the floor can never, in equilibrium, infer the exact 
value of the random variable from the committee's bill.25 Recall from Definition 1 that 
a legislative equilibrium requires that the strategy of the committee be optimal given the 
floor's strategy and beliefs, and that the floor's beliefs be realized in equilibrium. For any 
floor strategy that presumes' a one-to-one relationship between the committee's bill and w, 
the committee has an incentive to report a bill that causes the floor to make an erroneous 
inference about w that would lead to an outcome closer or equal to the committee's ideal 
point. Because of this incentive, the floor's beliefs cannot be realized in equilibrium, and 
there exists no equilibrium in which exact inference is possible.26 
At best, a legislative equilibrium for the game must involve noisy signal/ing.21 A 
noisy signalling equilibrium permits the floor to make limited inferences about w from the 
committee's bill. That is, the floor can infer only that w lies in a particular range, or 
24 The cost term is omitted from the committee's expected utility only because specializa­
tion is assumed to occur for analysis of the legislative game. Were the term to be included, 
the statement would hold whenever k < CT�. Further discussion of the cost term is deferred
until analysis of the expertise games. 
25 Were such exact inference possible, the equilibrium would be called "fully revealing" 
or "separating" because it "fully reveals" the previously private information or perfectly 
"separates" the message (bill) into types (values of w ). 
26 Formally, suppose the floor believes it can infer w from the committee's bill. Then the 
floor adopts the policy p = -w, where w is the floor's inference about w given b, i.e. b-1 (w ) .
But given this floor strategy, the committee wants the floor to believe that w = w - Xe,
since x = p + w = -w + w = Xe, the committee's ideal point.
27 Such equilibria are sometimes called "pooling" because they "pool" the private infor­
mation thus not allowing a unique type (value of w) to be inferred from a given message
(bill). 
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partition, of the (0 , 1] interval. 
To identify this equilibrium, let N be the number of partitions of the unit interval 
(the support of w) and let a; be the boundaries of the partitions (where a; < a;+1 for
i = O, . . .  , N) .  Then set a0 equal to zero (the lowest value of w) and aN equal to one 
(the highest value of w). Proposition 2 identifies the legislative equilibrium, the expected 
utilities, and the Pareto optimality of the realized outcomes for (Pu l s=  1 ).28 
P ROPOSITION 2. For the legislative game (Puls = 1) ,
a. for w E (a; ,  a;+l], a legislative equilibrium is
b*(w) E (xe - a;+l , Xe - a;] ,
*(b) -
-(a; + a;+1) d p - 2 
, an 
g*(b) = {w lw E (a; , a;+l] } ,
where a0 = 0, a; = a1 i + 2i(l  - i)xe, aN = 1, and N is the greatest integer 
spialler than t + Jxe(Xe + 2)/2xe; 
b. the expected utilities are 
(12 x2(N2 - 1)  
Eu1(Puls = l} = -ffi - c 3 and 
ul ) CT�
x�( N2 - 1) 2 k d Eue(P s = l  = - N2 - 3 
- Xe - ; an 
c. outcomes are Pareto optimal if and only if w E ((a; + a;+i ) /2, Xe + (a; + a;+i )/2] ,
i = 0, . .  . , N .
28 The (Pul s =  1} game is based on Crawford and Sobel. Two sources of nonuniqueness 
of legislative equilibria arise in the model. First, for any equilibrium involving N > 1, there 
always exist alternative equilibria with fewer partitions. That is, "coarser" equilibria also 
exist. A strong case can be made for considering only the equilibriu:n with the "�n�st"
partition, however. Ex ante utility of both the floor and the committee are max1m1zed 
under the finest equilibrium. Crawford and Sobel (p. 1442-3) present other arguments 
as well. Moreover, considering coarser equilibria of the (Pu ls = 1}  game only exaggerates 
the differences between restrictive and unrestrictive procedures. A second source of non­
uniqueness of the legislative equilibrium involves the floor'.s beli.efs and the commit;ee's b�lls.Since this form of non-uniqueness does not affect the relat10nsl11p between w and p , we v1�w
it as an inessential non-uniqueness and explore it no further. The reader should exercise 
caution, however, in using the current model make inferences about committee behavior 
apart from that contained in the text (e.g., do committee proposals get amended?). 
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Figure 4 illustrates the legislative equilibrium and policy consequences for the legisla­
tive game (Puls = 1} .  The noisy signalling equilibrium represents the maximum use of
information given a rational floor actor who recognizes the committee's incentive to use 
this information strategically. Since the committee has an incentive to report bills that 
cause the floor to infer that w is smaller than it actually is, large bills signal small values 
of w and are discounted heavily by the floor. These are represented by the upper shaded 
region in Figure 4 and corresponding wide interval of the random variable on the horizontal
axis, w E [O, ai] . Small bills, in contrast, signal large w somewhat more precisely. Thus, as 
shown by the lower shaded region, for any bill less than Xe - a;,  the floor can correctly infer 
that the random variable is in a relatively small interval, w E [a;, 1 ] .
A more concrete illustration of this signalling equilibrium is given by Figure 4 and the
following example. Let Xe refer to the change in farm income desired by a high-demand
agriculture committee, x represent change in farm income, p represent change in govern­
ment subsidies to farmers, and w represent aggregate change in farm income from the 
nongovernmental sources. Suppose the committee possesses private information that w is 
low. According to Proposition 2, the committee reports a bill proposing large increases in 
subsidies. However, knowing the committee's incentive to understate w (nongovernmental 
sources of farm income), the floor's inferences about w are quite crude. In equilibrium, a 
bill proposing large increases in subsidies can correspond to any w in a large interval. For 
high values of w, however, the committee proposes relatively low change in governmental
subsidies. This proposal allows the floor to make inferences about w that are more precise
than those possible given large proposed farm subsidies. Notice, however, that the floor is 
never able to infer the exact value of w.
To illustrate more clearly why the bill, policy and beliefs in Proposition 2 represent 
equilibrium behavior, it is useful to look more closely at the floor's optimal policy (p* ) and 
beliefs (g*) and the committee's optimal bill (b*). The committee's optimal bill reflects 
the value of the random variable (which the floor does not know) and the committee's 
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preferences (which the floor does know). In equilibrium, the floor must eliminate the bias 
from the implicit signal about the random variable in the committee's bill. If the floor 
believes that w is in a given interval [a;, a;+1 J ,  the policy that maximizes its expected utility
is minus the midpoint of that belief interval (-(a; + a;+i )/2), because this policy yields an
expected outcome of the floor's ideal point. For the two belief intervals in Figure 4, these
optimal policies are represented by the horizontal lines at -a;/2 and -(a; + 1 )/2. Notice
that the corresponding realized outcomes (the diagonal lines) are symmetrically distributed 
about the floor's ideal point ( x I) and are therefore unbiased.
A further requirement for equilibrium is that the floor's belief about the signal contained 
in the bill be based on rational behavior by the committee. Proposition 2a states that 
whenever w E (a;, a;+1] ,  the committee reports a bill in [xe - ai+l , Xe - ai] .  This behavior is
rational only if whenever the random variable lies exactly on a boundary of a partition (w =
ai), the committee is indifferent between the realized outcomes associated with floor's two
optimal policies (-(a; +a;+t )/2 and -(a; + a;_ i )/2). These outcomes are shown in Figure 4
as X1 and x2 , respectively. As required for an equilibrium, these points are equidistant from
the committee's ideal point. If the committee were not indifferent between these outcomes 
for all boundary points (w = a;), then it would have an incentive to misrepresent the range
in which w is contained. The condition a; = a1 i + 2i(l - i)xc in Proposition 2a guarantees 
this indifference and, along with the unbiased expectations of the floor, establishes that the 
behavior described in the proposition is an equilibrium. 
The expected utilities in Proposition 2b show that specialization can reduce the losses 
due to uncertainty. The extent of these informational benefits are closely related to the 
difference between floor and committee ideal points, as reflected by Xe in the expressions.
The closer are the two points, the greater is the number of partitions. For example, for 
sufficiently extreme committee preferences (specifically, Xe 2: 3a!) ,  the number of parti­
tions (N) is one, and the equilibrium is the same as in (Pu ls = O}.  But for less extreme
committee preferences (xe < 3a!), the number of partitions increases and the floor is able
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to make more refined inferences about w. 'J;'hese inferences continue to become more and 
more precise as committee and floor ideal points converge and the number of partitions 
approaches infinity.29 Ceteris paribus, homogeneity of committee-floor preferences causes
policy-making to become more informed and reduces the loss due to uncertainty. That is, 
as floor and committee ideal points coincide, more precise information is available during 
selection of policy, and expected utilities increase. Notice, however, that the possibility of 
use of greater use of the committee's private information still does not bias the outcomes 
towards the committee. Because expected outcomes remain at the floor's ideal point, the 
floor's expected utility exceeds the committee's by x� + k. In other words, even when the 
committee specializes, it incurs a distributional loss ( x�) in addition to the direct cost of 
acquiring expertise ( k ). 
Similar to equilibrium outcomes in (Puls = O}, the outcomes in (Puls  = 1) are not 
always Pareto optimal. Within any given partition, the realized outcomes are symmetrically 
distribut�d about x ! ·  Thus, at least half and typically more than half of the outcomes are 
not Pareto optimal. Still, in comparison to the (Pu l s=  O} game, the ability of the floor to 
make even crude inferences enhances Pareto optimality. Generally, the likelihood of Pareto 
outcomes is positively monotonic in the number of partitions which, in turn, is negatively 
related to the difference between the floor and committee ideal points. 
The legislative game with unrestrictive procedures and committee specialization is con­
sistent with other observations regarding the strategic use of information by standing com­
mittees.30 Committee specialization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for informed 
oecision-making by the parent body. Strategic use of information by committees constrains 
the committee's informational role. Moreover, in equilibrium, this constraining effect in-
creases as committee and floor preferences diverge. 
29 Although Xe enters the expected utility equations directly and indirectly (through N),  
the expression -a!/N2 - x�(N2 - 1)/3 i s  decreasing in  Xe ·  
30  See, for  example, Fenno's ( 1966) discussion surrounding the passage quoted in  Section I. 
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Expertise and Efficiency under Unrestrictive Procedures 
The preceding analysis of the legislative games under unrestricted procedures provides 
a basis for addressing issues of committee expertise. Under what conditions does the com­
mittee acquire policy expertise under unrestrictive amendment procedures, and what are 
the efficiency properties of this expertise equilibrium? Because the committee alone decides 
whether or not to specialize, the expertise equilibrium is determined simply by evaluat­
ing the expected utility of the committee under the two legislative games, (Puls = 0) and 
(Puls = 1) .  The committee specializes if and only if Eue(Puls = 1) > Eue(Pu ls  = 0). Propo­
sition 3 identifies the expertise equilibrium and conditions for expertise efficiency under 
unrestrictive amendment procedures. 
P ROPOSITION 3 . The properties of the pu expertise game are: 
a. the committee's equilibrium specialization decision is: 
if k � fu and 
otherwise; and 
b. the game is expertise efficient if and only if
k < f u or k > 2f u ,
- 1 x2(N2-1) where ku = a!(l - :;:rr ) - � ·
The term f u is derived from the expected utility expressions in Propositions 1 and 231 
and has two intuitive interpretations. First, for each actor it represents the informational 
gain from committee specialization under the unrestrictive procedure. That is, given equi­
librium behavior under pu, f u represents the increment in utility that the committee and
floor acquire from the presence of (asymmetric) information. Second, for the committee 
the term can also be interpreted as the cost at .which the committee is indifferent between 
31 Formally, fu = Eu;(Puls = 1} - Eu;(Puls = 0) for i = c, f (net of k in the case of the
committee). 
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specializing and not specializing. For k > f u, the committee's expected benefits from spe­
cializing are exceeded by the cost, therefore it will not specialize. For k < f u, the converse
holds. 
Obviously, the number of noisy signalling intervals (N) must exceed one for the com­
mittee to specialize, since if N = 1, the condition in Proposition 3a reduces to k < 0 which, '
by assumption, cannot hold. However, N > 1 s not sufficient for specialization because the
increment in expected utility for the committee in the corresponding partition equilibrium 
( k") must also exceed the committee's cost of specialization. As this cost becomes large 
and/or as the benefit from the partition equilibrium becomes small, specialization will not 
occur and joint gains from legislative specialization are foregone in equilibrium. 
The expertise efficiency properties of the unrestrictive procedure are illustrated in Fig­
ure 5. For k :-::; 2k", the committee should always specialize according to the efficiency
criterion. However, the committee will specialize only when k < k". Because the self­
interested committee ignores the gains to the floor from specialization, the committee often 
"underspecializes" by choosing not to acquire expertise even though it would be used to the 
benefit of the parent body. Finally, for k > 2k", the committee again does not specialize.
For costs this great, however, the expected joint benefits do not merit specialization, thus 
nonspecialization is expertise efficient. 
The expertise efficiency limitations of P" result from the asymmetry in the distribution 
of the benefits and costs from specialization. The benefits (k") accrue symmetrically to the 
floor and the committee in terms of equilibrium policies that reduce uncertainty. But 
the costs ( k) are borne entirely by the committee. Because the committee receives no 
distributional compensation for incurring costs to acquire information-that is, because 
expected outcomes remain at the floor's ideal point under both games (P"ls = 0) and 
(P"ls = 1)-it is not surprising that the committee often chooses not to specialize PVen 
though specialization would enhance the joint utility of the decision-makers. 
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V. Restrictive Amendment Procedures 
This section identifies legislative equilibria for the two legislative games ( (Pri s= 0) and 
(Pr is = 1 ) )  and the expertise equilibrium for the restrictive amendment procedure (Pr). 
This procedure limits the floor's choice of policy to {b, p0}, where p0 is the status quo 
policy. The section also presents the expected utilities in the pr games and assesses Pareto 
optimality and expertise efficiency. 
Restrictive Procedures without Committee Expertise 
The legislative equilibrium for (Pris = 0) depends on the status quo policy, p0, which 
yields an outcome x = p0 + w.32 As under unrestrictive procedures, the floor observes that 
the committee has no private information and thus cannot make inferences about w from the 
committee's bill. Unlike P", however, the floor is constrained to choose between Po and b. 
The floor chooses the policy that maximizes its expected utility given its prior beliefs about 
w. The committee, therefore, proposes a bill that maximizes its expected utility subject
to the constraint that the floor's expected utility is at least as great as it would be under 
the status quo. Proposition 4 identifies the legislative equilibrium, the floor and committee 
expected utilities, and the Pareto optimality of the realized outcomes for (Prls = O) .  
P ROPOSITION 4. For the  legislative game (Prl s=O) ,
a . the legislative equilibrium is 
{ Xe - W  
· -Po - 1
b* = 
b' 
p*(b) = {
b 
Po 
ifp0 :-:; -xe - W  or Po 2 Xe - W, 
if po E (-xe - w, -w), and
if po E [-w, Xe - w], 
where b' E P s. t. Eu1(b') :-::; Eu1(p0 ) ,  
if Eu1(b) > Eu1(Po),  and
otherwise, and 
g*(b) = {w I w E (0, 1]};
32 See Romer and Rosenthal for a similar spatial model. 
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b. for p0 = - t ,  the expected u tilities are 
Eu 1(Prl s  = 0) = -a� and
Eue(Prl s  = 0) = -a� - X�i and
c. for p0 = - t ,33 outcomes are Pareto optimal if and only ifw E (w, Xe +  wJ.
The legislative equilibrium under (Pris = 0) is identical to (Puls = 0) with the following
exception. The optimal bill (b*) and policy (p*) are functions of the status quo point (Po) · 
Consequently, Figure 6 differs from previous figures of legislative equilibria by graphing 
proposals as a function of the status quo point. For a status quo point equal to -w, behavior
and beliefs are identical to that in the analogous game under unrestrictive procedures, 
(Pu l s = 0) (see Figure 3). As in the legislative game under unrestrictive procedures and
without specialization ((Pu ls = 0) ), the committee's behavior is inconsequential. Regardless
of what bill is reported, the floor adopts the status quo policy, because p0 yields an expected 
outcome that is closer to the floor's ideal point. 
However, for extreme values of Po (specifically, p0 If. [-w, Xe - w]) ,  the committee's
optimal proposal is not only consequential but also accepted by the floor. Although the 
floor expects the bill to yield an outcome equal to Xe, it expects to do worse under p0 •
Thus, even though uncertainty is symmetric, the committee can reap benefits from extreme 
values of p0 because of the restrictions on the floor's opportunities to amend. These possible 
distributional benefits to the committee under pr are realized more generally in the next
and final legislative game. 
Restrictive Procedures with Committee Expertise 
The legislative equilibrium for (Pris = 1) also depends on the status quo point, p0•
However, it differs from the (Puls = 1) equilibrium in one important respect. For extreme
33 The assumption that p0 = - t  simplifies the calculations and facilitates comparison of
the legislative equilibria under pu and pr. This status quo point has several reasonable
properties. It is the legislative equilibrium for (Pu l s= 0), and it is stable against other bills 
or amendments in games (Pul s = 0) and (Pris = 0). Furthermore, the expected outcome
from the policy p = - t  is the floor's ideal point.
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values of  the random variable (specifically, w < -3Xe - Po and w 2'. Xe - Po ), the floor can
infer the precise value of w from the committee's bill. Even though the resulting policy is 
equal to the committee's ideal point, the floor prefers this outcome to that yielded by the 
status quo. In contrast, for moderate values (w E (-3xe - Po,  Xe - Po] ), noisy signalling
again occurs. Then the floor does not prefer outcomes at the committee's ideal point to 
those given by the status quo and, as in (Pu l s = 1), the committee has an incentive to cause
the floor to infer a smaller value of w. Thus, in this range no legislative equilibrium exists 
in which the floor can make exact inferences about w. Proposition 5 identifies a legislative 
equilibrium, the floor and committee expected utilities, and the Pareto optimality of the 
realized outcomes for (Pris = 1).
P ROPOSITION 5 .  For the legislative game (Prl s = l) ,
a. the legislative equilibrium is 
b*(w) = 4:e
-
+ Po ifw E (-3Xe - Po , -Xe - Po), and
{ x w ifw E (0, -3xe) or w E (xe - Po> 1),
p*(b) =
g*(b) =
b E (po ,  Po + 4xe) if W E (-Xe - Po , Xe - Po} i  
{ b if b 2'. Po + 4xe or b :S:: Po, and 
Po if b E (po ,  Po + 4xe), b > Xe, or b < Xe - 1;
{ Xe - b if b > Po + 4Xe or b :S:: Po1
{w lw E [-3xe - Po , -Xe - Po) } i f  b = Po + 4xe,
{w lw E (-Xe - Po , Xe - Po) } i f  b E (po ,  Po + 4xe),  and
{w lw E (0, 1)} if b > Xe or b < Xe - 1;
b. the expected u tilities are 
Eu1(Pr l s=  1) = -a� ( 4xe)3 - x�,  and
Eue(Prls  = 1) = - a�( 4xe)3 - k; and
c. for p0 = - t ,  outcomes are Pareto optimal if and only if
w E (0, w - 3xc) or w E [w, 1).
32 
b 
0 
Xe - W  
-w 
FIGURE 6 
Legislative Equilibrium: Restrictive Procedure 
without Committee Expertise 
----- b* (p o)
:Xe w -w 
P o  Xe-W 
Legend 
b* Cpo ) =
(See Proposition 4) 
Figure 7 illustrates a legislative equilibrium and outcomes for (Pris = 1) .34 The com­
mittees optimal bill (b•) is shown by the dotted line and shaded area. The different bills 
for different values of the random variable illustrate that for moderate values of w, the floor 
cannot infer the precise value of w from the committee's bill. This is similar to the analogous 
result under pu, namely that specialization does not guarantee informed decision-making.
The equilibrium for the (Pri s  = 1} game has several important differences from equilib­
ria of previous games, however. First, the expected outcome equals the committee 's ideal 
point. That is , in contrast to the unrestrictive procedure, the restrictive procedure confers 
distributional benefits to the committee. Second, for more extreme values of the random 
variable, the floor can make precise inferences from the committee's bill, unlike in all previ­
ous games. Third, when the floor can make such inferences, the committee's bill is always 
certain to yield an outcome at the committee's ideal point. Nevertheless, the floor accepts 
the bill because the outcome under the status quo is worse and, of course, because the 
restrictive procedure prohibits amendment. In sum, the equilibrium reflects the significant, 
pro-committee distributional properties of the restrictive procedure. 
The expected utility of the floor in (Pris = 1} reflects a distributional loss (-x�) .  Re­
call that in all previous games this term entered into the committee's expected utility. The 
common term in the expected utility expressions ( -a�( 4xe)3) represents the informational 
properties of pr, As in pu, for sufficiently small Xe (specifically Xe < ! = 3a�), special­
ization results in a net gains for both actors. Furthermore, these gains are decreasing in 
Xe, so the greater is the difference between floor and committee preferences, the smaller are 
the informational benefits from specialization under pr, The key unanswered question is 
whether and when the distributional losses the floor suffers under pr are offset by the in­
formational gains. Prerequisite to answering this question is derivation of conditions under 
which the committee specializes under pr,
34 In the Figure, p0 + 4xe = x ! ·  This is not true in general, however.
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Expertise and Efficiency under Restrictive Procedures 
Given a restrictive procedure, when will the committee choose to acquire policy exper­
tise? By assumption, the committee specializes if and only if Eue(Prls = 1) > Eue(Prls  = 0).
Proposition 6 identifies the expertise equilibrium and the conditions for expertise efficiency 
under the restrictive procedure. 
P ROPOSITION 6. The properties of the pr expertise game are: 
a. the committee's equilibrium specialization decision is: 
s• = { � if k :::; 'kr + x� ,  and
otherwise; and 
b. the game is expertise efficient only if 
(i) Xe < x� and either k 2: 2kr or k :::; kr + x�, or 
(ii) Xe > x� and either k :::; 2kr or k 2: kr + x� ,
where 'kr = a�[l - ( 4xe)3], and x� solves 'kr = x�2 •
As illustrated i n  Figure 8 ,  the committee i s  willing t o  incur a cost equal to kr + x�
to specialize. This expression is derived from Propositions 4 and 5 and represents the 
expected gain for the committee in (Pris = 1 )  relative to (Pris = 0). The gain consists
of the distributional component, x�, and an informational component, fr . Analogous to
ku above, the informational component, 'kr, reflects the expected gain to both actors from
decision-making under pr with specialization. However, because of the pro-committee
distributional consequences of pr, the committee's incentive to specialize is stronger than
the common informational term alone reflects. 
The expertise equilibrium under pr exhibits some of the same characteristics as the
equilibrium under pu. A moderate committee (Xe < x�) may choose to specialize too seldom
for relatively moderate costs of specialization (specifically, k E (kr + x� ,  2kr )) .  Similar to
pu , pr yields underspecialization because the committee's disregards the benefits that
the floor obtains from reduction in uncertainty. However, for more extreme committees 
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(Xe � x�), the expertise equilibrium under pr differs significantly from that under P" (cf. 
Figure 5). In this interval the committee overspecializes because the distributional gain to 
the committee increases in Xe, while the informational gains decreases in Xe. Indeed, for 
Xe > 3a�, the informational gains are negative. Finally, as in the pu expertise game, for 
very high costs of specialization (k > 2i.;r if Xe < x�, and k > i.;r + x� if Xe � x� ) ,  the 
committee's choice not to specialize is expertise efficient. 
VI. Equilibrium of the Procedural Game 
The comparative analyses of amendment procedures presented above identify some nor-
mative properties of legislative and expertise equilibria, namely, ( ex post) Pareto optimality 
of legislative games and (ex ante) expertise efficiency of expertise games. In this section 
we address the central, positive concern of the paper. Given the parent chamber's ability 
to engage in procedural as well as policy choices, under what conditions will it choose to 
restrict its ability to amend committee bills? Proposition 7 summarizes the floor's choice 
of procedure as a function of the parameters of the model, Xe and k. 
P ROPOSITION 7.  The equilibrium of the procedural game is:
{
pr 
pr 
P* = 
pu 
pu 
if Xe ::; X�, 
if xe E (x�, x�) and k > i.;u ,
if xe E (x� , x�) and k < i.;u,  and
if xe � X� .  
where x �  solves i.;r = k u  + x �  and x� solves i.;r = x�2 • 
Figure 9 illustrates the proposition. The horizontal axis, Xe, represents the difference 
between the ideal points of the committee and floor. The vertical axis measures the com-
mittee's cost of specialization ( k) and the utility differential to the floor of the restrictive 
versus unrestrictive procedures (Eu 1 (Pr) - Eu 1(Pu)) for a given specialization decision. 
The dotted curves represent specialization indifference of the committee. The top dotted 
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curve (kr + x�)  is the cost at which the committee is indifferent between specializing and 
not specializing under pr (see Proposition 6 and Figure 8) .  The bottom dotted curve (k" ) 
has the same interpretation for pu (see Proposition 3 and Figure 3). The solid curves rep­
resent the floor's preference over procedure in the form of utility differential curves which 
are derived from Propositions 1 ,  2, 4 and 5. Whenever the expression is positive (negative),  
the floor prefers the restrictive (unrestrictive) procedure.35 The relevant utility differential 
curve is given by the committee's specialization decision. For example, for costs at which 
the committee specializes under either procedure (k < i.;u ), the appropriate utility differ­
ential curve is i.;r - x� - k", which illustrates that the restrictive (unrestrictive) procedure 
will be chosen for all Xe ::; x� (Xe > x�). Thus, the specialization indifference and utility 
differential curves illustrate the procedural equilibrium. 
With these preliminaries, the interpretation of Proposition 7 is straightforward. The 
proposition states the procedural equilibrium over three intervals of Xe• For concreteness, 
committees are regarded as "moderate" when Xe ::; x�, "extreme" when Xe E ( x�, x�), and 
"very extreme" when Xe � x�. 
First, for all moderate committees (Xe ::; x�), the floor prefers the restrictive to unre-
strictive procedure, regardless of the cost of specialization. For costs such that specialization 
occurs under both procedures (k < i.;u) ,  the informational gains from pr over pu  (kr - k")
outweigh the distributional losses from pr (-x�) ,  as shown by the bottom utility differ­
ential curve (kr - x� - ku > O). For moderate committees, decision-making is so much 
more informed and the distributional losses are so low under pr that even when pr is not 
needed to induce the committee to specialize, the floor is still better off by choosing pr. For 
somewhat larger costs such that specialization occurs only under pr (ku < k ::;  i.;r + x�) ,  the 
informational gain from pr over pu (kr) is larger than the distributional losses of pr (-x� ) ,  
as shown by the upper utility differential curve (kr  - x� ) .  For moderate committees, the 
35 Strict equality of the utility differential will be characterized as weak preference for a 
procedure. 
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ability of the floor to induce the committees to specialize under pr when they would not 
under pu always results in a substantial increase in the floor's expected utility. Finally, 
for costs so large that specialization is absent under both procedures, the floor's payoff is 
unaffected by its procedural choice. Thus, for moderate committees, the floor is weakly 
better off by adopting restrictive procedures. 
Second, for more extreme committees (xc E (x�, x�)), the floor's choice of a particular 
procedure depends on specialization costs, k. For costs that induce specialization under 
both procedures (k < ku) ,  the informational gains from pr over pu are less than the
distributional losses from pr, as shown by the bottom utility differential curve ( kr -x� -ku < 
0). For extreme committees, the informational gains to the floor from pr are not sufficient 
to offset the distributional loss of pr whenever the committee would have specialized under 
either procedure. However, for costs such that specialization occurs only under pr (ku < 
k � kr + x�) ,  the informational gain from pr over pu is larger than the distributional 
losses of pr, as shown by the upper utility differential curve (kr - x�) . Thus, for extreme 
committees, the ability of the floor to induce the committees to specialize under pr when 
they would not under pu always results in an increase in the floor's expected utility. Finally, 
for costs so large that specialization is absent under both procedures, the floor's expected 
utility is unaffected by its procedural choice. Thus, for extreme committees, the floor is 
weakly better off choosing the restrictive procedure for k > ku and is strictly better off
choosing the unrestrictive procedure for k :::; ku.
Third, for very extreme committees (Xe 2: x�) ,  the floor prefers the unrestrictive to the
restrictive procedure, regardless of the cost of specialization. For costs such that special­
ization occurs under both procedures (k < ku) ,  the informational gains from pr over pu
are less than the distributional losses from pr, as shown by the bottom utility differential 
curve (kr - x� - ku < 0) .  For very extreme committees, the informational gains to the
floor from pr are not sufficient to offset the distributional losses of the pr whenever the 
committee would have specialized under either procedure. For specialization costs such 
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that specialization occurs only under pr (ku < k :::; kr + x�), the informational gain from 
pr over pu is smaller than the distributional losses of pr, as shown by the upper utility 
differential curve (kr - x�). For very extreme committees, the ability of the floor to induce
the committees to specialize under pr when it would not under pu does not enhance the 
floor's expected utility. Finally, for costs so large that specialization is absent under both 
procedures, the floor's expected utility is unaffected by its procedural choice. Thus, for very 
extreme committees, the floor is weakly better off adopting the unrestrictive procedure. 
In summary, Proposition 7 and Figure 9 build on Propositions 1-6 to establish the main 
result of the paper. Under a wide range of conditions, the choice of restrictive procedures 
is a rational response by a parent chamber that needs information and relies upon standing 
committees to acquire it. As long as the preferences of the committee and the parent 
chamber are not extremely divergent and the cost of gathering information by the committee 
is not prohibitive, the parent chamber strictly prefers to restrict its ability to amend its 
committees' proposals. Furthermore, even when discrepancies in preferences are extreme, 
it may be in the parent chamber's interest to adopt restrictive procedures to induce the 
committee to specialize. Generally, however, the value of restrictive procedures to the parent 
chamber diminishes as the preferences of the committee and parent chamber diverge. 
VII. Discussion 
The dominant focus of the paper has been on the informational role of committees, more 
specifically on a committee's incentive to acquire expertise which, in equilibrium, may be 
used beneficially. This discussion elaborates on several empirical implications of the model, 
first for the 19th Century procedural puzzle posed in Section II, then for congressional 
politics more broadly, and finally for generic issues of collective choice in institutions with 
endogenous procedures. 
The proposed solution to the historical puzzle concerning the dramatic increase in the 
use of restrictive procedures in the 19th Century House stems from the focus on decision-
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making under uncertainty. Ceteris paribus, the subtle but salutary effects of restrictive 
procedures ought to be especially compelling in times of policy innovation when, almost 
by definition, the relationship between policies and their consequences is not well-known. 
According to several measures and historical accounts, the late 19th Century was precisely 
such a period of change and uncertainty. Economic change was broadly reflected by dramatic 
shifts in the regional distribution of population.36 Urbanization of the population also 
accelerated (Chandler: 6) ,  industrial and agricultural productivity soared ( Keller), national 
markets for consumer and producer goods arose (Chandler), and modern financial and 
corporate institutions also appeared and became important elements in a growing national 
economy (Davis; Chandler; Keller). 
Congress paid a major part in these changes. Keller, for example, relates abrupt 
changes in the social, economic and political environment to increasing congressional activ-
ities and to the need for legislative specialization. 
Garfield thought that the work of Congress in 1877 was ten times heavier 
and more complicated than it had been forty years before. Twelve annual · 
appropriations bills occupied two-thirds of each session, when a genera­
tion earlier they had been dealt with in a week. The business that came 
before Congress inexombly grew: 37,409 public and private bills were in­
troduced from 1871 to 1881 ;  73,857 from 1881 to 1891 ;  81 ,060 from 1891 
to 1901 .  The Congressional Globe of 1839-1840 had 1 ,405 pages; the Con­
gressional Record of 1889-1890 was 1 1 ,568 pages long. The sheer weight 
and diversity of interests made tariff scheduling an increasingly compli­
cated and technical process. The Rivers and Harbors appropriations bill of 
1888 took care of individual congressmen's interests in traditional pork 
barrel fashion; but its drafters also had to take into account detailed 
surveys and estimates submitted by local engineers, the chief of army 
engineers, and the secretary of war. By the end of the century perma­
nent expenditures were allocated through 185 separate acts, including 13 
major annual appropriations bills (300-1, emphasis added). 
In sum, an apt modification of the Woodrow Wilson's quotation introducing Section II is 
that the late 19th Century Congress had indeed become a "business body" and restrictive 
procedures better enabled it to "get its business done."37 
36 For example, Easterlin (76) presents demographic data showing that in seven of nine 
.geographic regions, the regional share of national population changed more in the three 
decades, 1870-1900, than in the following five decades, 1900-1950 
37 Of course, other congressional change coincided with the marked procedural changes 
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Proposition 7 specifies the precise and surprisingly weak conditions under which restric­
tive procedures can lead to committee specialization and to relatively informed decision­
making on the floor. It should be noted, however, that restrictive procedures are not the sole 
solution to institutional problems posed by decision-making under uncertainty. Nor does the 
model ignore two additional key parameters of institutional design. Results similar to those 
presented above can also be derived for Xe and k, that is, the degree to which the committee 
has preference outliers and the cost the committee must bear to specialize. In legislative
settings, for example, the parent chamber (or party leaders) make committee assignments 
and allocate resources to committees. Thus, Xe and k have natural, substantive interpreta­
tions that yield testable imp�cations. One limitation of restrictive procedures is that when 
the costs the committee must bear to acquire information becomes excessive (k > kr + x�
in Figure 9), pr alone cannot induce the committee to gather information, even though by 
Proposition 6 specialization might be expertise efficient. In such cases, the parent chamber 
has an obvious incentive to subsidize the committee's informational activities and/or to al­
ter the committee's composition thereby changing the strategic situation to an (Xe, k) with
k < kr + x� . An empirical example is available from the contemporary Congress. In the
1970s when there was a widely perceived demand for national energy legislation,  several 
sessions of Congress nevertheless ended without passage of such legislation. The House's 
solution to the problem contained all three elements of legislative design reflected in the 
model: k, Xe, and P. First, an Ad Hoc Committee on Energy was established and given 
special staff, thus lowering the costs of information gathering.38 Second, the composition 
of the committee was more moderate than many of the committees that shared jurisdiction 
in the late 19th Century Congress. Most notable of these were changes in the party system 
(Brady) and in congressional careerism (Price; Fiorina, et al). We view these as wholly 
consistent with our admittedly narrower focus on procedures but have largely ignored them 
because of the difficulty in disentangling the complex and probably reciprocal relationships 
between parties, restrictive procedures, and careerism. For example, strong parties make 
restrictive procedures easier to execute and, once executed successfully, easier for back­
benchers (as beneficiaries) to stomach. Similarly, the enhanced ability of Congress to pass 
major legislation reinforced the willingness of legislators to adopt legislative politics as their 
careers and to confer benefits to constituents in sufficient quantities to make careerism not 
only desirable but also feasible (via reelection) .  
38 Some staff were new hires; others were borrowed from other committees ( Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1977: 721). Also, the Ad Hoc Committee consisted of subcommittee 
chairmen from various committees that shared jurisdiction on, and previously had fought 
over, energy policy. This gave the Ad Hoc Committee a comparative advantage in energy 
expertise. 
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on energy policy (Oppenheimer, 287-88). Third, after the jointly referred legislation was 
assembled by the Ad Hoc Committee and prepared for floor consideration, a modified rule 
was assigned that restricted amendments to those offered by the Ad Hoc Committee.39 
In terms of Figure 9, these actions can be summarized as a south-westerly shift of the 
(X e,  k) situation. Their final effect,  more or less consistent with the model, was significant
committee activity and final passage of national energy legislation (Oppenheimer; Vogler) .  
Another implication of  the model concerns the long-standing interest of  legislative 
scholars in the relationship between committees and their parent chamber.40 Beginning 
with early research,41 most studies suggest that the influence of committees on policies is 
substantial. More recently, much of the literature attributes disproportionate committee 
influence to procedures, such as those governing the initiation, consideration and final ap­
proval of legislation.42 One claim in these studies is that "the explanation of committee 
power resides in the rules governing the sequence of proposing, amending, and especially 
of vetoing in the legislative process" more than in "information and expertise" (Shepsle 
and Weingast:  3, 5) .  Such arguments seem premature, however, given two limitations of 
the models on which they are based. First, information and expertise, while sometimes 
doubted as foundations of committee power, are not modeled in these studies. Second, 
neither is the choice of the rules governing the sequence of decision-making. This paper 
shows that addressing these limitations yields a more refined conclusion regarding com­
mittee power, information and expertise. In particular, the equilibrium to the game with 
incomplete information and procedural choice suggests that committee power can be derived 
from information and expertise and may be substantial. However, in light of the parent 
chamber's ability to choose procedures, committee power will exist only to the extent that 
it is congruent with the informational needs and policy preferences of the parent chamber. 
Because these empirical implications and substantive conclusions are derived from a 
model that may be regarded as extremely stylized, we conclude by reconsidering its as-
39 See H.Res. 797, Final Calendar of the Committee on Rules, 95th Congress, 1978, p.  43. 
40 See Eulau and McCluggage for an extensive review of this literature. 
41 See, , for example, Wilson ( 1885) and Luce. 
42 See, for example, Shepsle, and Denzau and Mackay on gatekeeping powers under 
open rules, Gilligan and Krehbiel on bundling and jurisdictional strategies under complex 
rules, and Shepsle and Weingast on conference procedures and the resolution of bicameral 
differences. 
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sumptions and associated caveats. First, several assumptions were made only to simplify 
the derivation of the propositions and are not critical to the qualitative claims.43 However, 
two assumptions are central to the results. First and obviously, incomplete information is 
a necessary ingredient in the argument. The corresponding caveat is simply that the model 
does not pertain to collective decision-making that takes place under conditions of perfect 
information. The informational rationale for restrictive procedures therefore is only one 
rationale and should not be viewed as inconsistent with others.44 Second, the sequence of 
the game is such that the parent chamber selects a procedure initially, with no opportunity 
to alter its choice later in the process. This is contrary to the literal sequence of decision­
making in the House of Representatives, for example, where special orders are written by 
the Rules Committee and voted by the parent chamber subsequent to the committee's 
reporting its bill. The assumption that the parent chamber can commit to procedures, 
while rigid, has two sets of defenses. The theoretical defense is simply that (to the best 
of our knowledge) this is the first attempt to model the actual choice of procedures, even 
though the need to do so has been stressec;l often.45 The empirical defenses, alluded to 
in Section II, stem from the fact that complex collective choice institutions often contain 
a variety of institutional devices and third parties whereby commitment is approximated. 
Again drawing from the House, these include precedents, standing rules, bill-specific rule­
makers ( the Rules Committee) and leaders (whips, majority and minority leaders and the 
Speaker) .  Precedents and standing rules make it relatively difficult to change procedures 
43 For example, the quadratic utility functions are not necessary; all that is required is 
strict quasi-concavity of utility over policy consequences. The independence of the costs 
borne by the committee to observe w, too, is unimportant; extensions in which the parent 
chamber shares in these costs (e.g., by appropriating funds for staff) would be simple. 
44 See, for example, Bach ( 1981); Fenno ( 1974); Manley; Oleszek; M. Robinson; and Kre­
hbiel. Of these, the informational rationale seems particularly consistent with conventional 
accounts of closed rules based on "complexity of the issues." If by ' "complexity," Fenno, 
Manley, and Robinson mean uncertainty regarding the relationship between policies and 
consequences, then frequent assignment of restrictive rules to the Ways and Means Com­
mittee, for example, may be interpreted as a procedural reward for having done "good 
work," that is, specializing for the benefit of the parent chamber. When such work ceased 
to exist-such as in the mid- 1970s when the Committee became larger, more liberal, and 
more junior, and its chairman became somewhat unpredictable-the parent chamber's re­
sponse was consistent with our informational rationale. The Committee's 42-year trend 
of receiving closed rules on tax: legislation was broken. (See Morrison and Rudder for a 
detailed accounts of the Ways and Means Committee throughout this period.) 
, 45 Citations are of the informal variety: correspondence, conversations, comments at con-
ferences and referee reports. 
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in response to short-sighted whims of issue-specific majorities. In turn, this increases the 
probability that procedural promises (e.g., regarding recognition or the assignment of rules) 
can by kept, provided that the promisors do not renege. Who, then, are the promisors, and 
why don't they renege? Typically, they are leaders and members of the Rules Committee. 
Attributes of these recipients of procedural powers include seniority (hence greater than 
average legislative experience and institutional knowledge), long-term time horizons (hence 
greater incentives to establish and maintain reputations for trustworthiness and institu­
tional responsibility) and ideological moderation (hence greater inclinations to look after 
the interests of the parent chamber at-large rather than extreme factions thereof). All of 
these empirical regularities suggest that something akin to commitment via delegation ex­
ists in collective bodies that are "institutionalized" (Polsby). However, we acknowledge the 
need for further work in this area, including the possibility of altering the sequence of the 
game as well as continued empirical study of the mechanisms of delegation of procedural 
power. In the meantime, the qualified conclusion is that to the extent that collective choice 
institutions have delegation devices that permit some form of commitment to a procedural 
choice, the use of restrictive procedures in the presence of uncertainty is less puzzling than 
was previously thought. 
VIII. Summary 
Restrictive amendment procedures often enhance the informational role of committees 
when the relationship between policies and their consequences is uncertain. The use of 
restrictive procedures results in policy outcomes that are more frequently mutually benefi­
cial to the committee and parent chamber than those yielded via unrestrictive procedures. 
Restrictive procedures also increase the incentive for committees to specialize in policies 
within their jurisdictions. In uncertain environments with costly information and divergent 
preferences, restrictive procedures can yield benefits from specialization not attainable via 
unrestrictive procedures. In light of the rapid social, economic and political change in the 
late 19th Century and the associated uncertainty about new and often complex legislation, 
the development and use of restrictive amendment procedures in the U.S. House between 
1870-1900 is consis.tent with the more general thesis of the paper. The informational ratio­
nale for restrictive procedures is that they enhance the informational role of committees. 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains proofs for the propositions that are not obvious from the text. 
Proposition 1. (a) For (Puls = 0),  the committee has no private information. This fact 
is public knowledge. Thus, g•(b) = {w E (H., O]} ,  where H. < 0 is the support of w and g*( · )
is identical to the floor's prior beliefs about w. Consequently, the floor chooses the policy 
that maximizes ll -(p + w)2 f(w) dw, where f(w) is the probability distribution function of
w. This policy is p• = -w, where w = E(w). Since the committee's bill has no relevance 
here, it is not restricted in equilibrium and b• E P. 
(b) Since p• = -w, outcomes outside the Pareto set, (0, Xe], are yielded by w < w and
w > Xe + w. However outcomes are contained in (0, Xe] for w E (w, Xe + w] .
ll -(-w + w)2 f(w) dw = -a� and Eue = ll -(w + w - xe)2 f(w) dw =
-a� - x�.
Proposition 2. (a) It must be the case that (i) given g•( ·) ,  p•(·) is optimal, (ii) given 
p•( · ), b•( ·)  is optimal, and (iii) the beliefs, g•( · ) ,  are consistent. 
To show (i) suppose that for b E (Xe - a;+l ,  x e - a;), the floor believes w E (a;, a;+ i ) · If 
the floor believes w E (a;, a;+1 ) ,  it chooses a policy that maximizes la�'+' -(p+w)2 f(w) dw.
This policy is p• (b) = -(a; + a;+1 )/2. 
Condition (ii) requires that given p•( · ) ,  b•(-) must be optimal. This occurs only if the 
committee is indifferent between inducing p = -(a; + a;+1 ) / 2 and p = -(a;-1 + a; ) / 2 
whenever w = a;. If the committee has a strict preference for one of these policies when 
w = a;, then for either w = a; + €  or w = a; - €, b•(·) is not optimal for € > 0. Thus, it
must be the case that 
[-(a; + a;+I)  ] 2 r -(ai-1 + a;)  ] 2 -
2 
+ a; - Xe = - 2 + a; - Xe , 
which is true, given a;-1 < a; < a;+1 1 if and only if a;+1 = 2a; - a;-1 - 4xe. This second­
order difference equation has a class of solutions parameterized by a1 of the form a; = 
a1 i + 2i(l - i)xe, for i = 0, . . . , N where N is the largest integer such that l 2 i( l - i)xel < 1 ,
which is  given as the greatest integer smaller than the value t + Jxe(Xe + 2)/2xe. 
Condition (iii) requires that for consistency, g•(b) = {wlb = b•(w)} .  That is, that 
the floor holds beliefs about w that are consistent with the optimal behavior of the corn-
44 
mittee given w. For b E (xe - ai+I •  Xe - ai ) , the floor believes w E (ai, ai+d· For
w E (a;, ai+1 ), b• E (xe - a;+1 i Xe - ai) ·  Thus, the floor's beliefs are consistent.
(b) Recall that p• = -(a; + a;+J )/2. Thus, the outcome is contained in (0, Xe] if and 
only if w E ((ai + a;+i )/2, Xe + (a; + lli+J )/2) .
( c) To calculate expected utilities, substitute the value of aN determined by aN
1, (1 - 2N(l - N)xe]/N, into the solution of the difference equation. This yields ai =
-/v + 2i(N - i)xe, and a; - a;-1 = f:r + 2(N + 1 - 2i)xe. Then,
E _ ;.- !. a; [ (a; + ai-1 ) ] 2 d � - �  - w - w
i=t a i - 1  2 
Similarly, 
N 
= -a! L (a; - a;_i )3
= -a!
i=l 
N 1 3L [N + 2(N + 1 - 2i)xe] i=l 
= _ a� _ x�(N2 - 1 )
N2 3 
Eu = - a� -
x�(N2 - 1) 
- x2 - k e N2 3 e •
Proposition 4. ( a) Given (Pris = 0) ,  the floor adopts b if and only if it expects to be
better off under b than p0• Thus, the committee will choose b to maximize 1: -(b + w -
Xe)2 f(w) dw subject to the constraint 1: -(b + w)2 f(w) dw 2: 1: -(p0 + w)2 /Cw) dw. For
Po .'S -Xe-W and Po 2: Xe-w, the floor prefers the committee's ideal point, b* = Xe -w, to
those expected under the status quo. For p0 E (-xe -w,  -w], the committee can maximize
its utility and still leave the floor indifferent between b and p0 by choosing b• = -p0 - 0. 
For Po E (-w, Xe - w] ,  the committee cannot makes itself better off without decreasing the
floor's expected utility. Since s = 0, g*(b) = {wlw E (�1 0]} .
(b)  Whenever Po = -w, the committee cannot alter the status quo in the (Pris = 0)
game. Thus, p• = Po and x = Po +  w. For w < w, x < 0. For w > Xe + w, x > Xe·
(c)  For Po = -w, b*(Po) = Po =  -w and Eu1 = -a�, Eue = -a� - x�, the same as in
(Pu!s = O). 
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Proposition 5. (a) It must be the case that (i) given g*( · ) ,  p*( · ) is optimal, ( i i )  given
p*( - ) ,  b*( - )  is optimal, and (iii) the beliefs, g*( -)  are consistent.
To show (i) suppose that for all b E P such that b E (xe - 0, p0) or b E (xe, 4xe + 
p0], g*(b) = Xe - b. Given these beliefs, it is optimal for the floor to accept the committee's
bill since -x� 2: (Po + w)2 for all w < -3Xe - Po and w 2: Xe - p0• Suppose that for
b = 4xe + p0, g*(b) = {wlw E (-3Xe - p0, -Xe - p0)}. Given these beliefs, it remains
optimal for the floor to accept the committee's bill since f:3";e�;. - (  4xe+Po +w )2 f(w) dw 2:f:3";e�;. -(po +w)2 f(w) dw. And finally, suppose that for b E [4xe +Po ,  Po] ,  g*(b) = {wlw E
(-Xe - p0, Xe - p0)} .  Given these beliefs, it is optimal for the floor to sustain Po1 since Po
maximizes 1�;�!.;, -(p + w)2 f(w) dw. Thus, given g*(b), p• is optimal.
Condition (ii) requires that given p•( - ) ,  b*(w) must be optimal. Similar to Proposi­
tion 2.a, this occurs if and only if the committee is indifferent between inducing neighbor­
ing p•(-) at relevant values of w. This is true if the committee's utility at w = -3xe -
p0, w = -Xe - p0 , and w = Xe - Po is equal given alternative neighboring policies. For 
W = -3Xe - Po 1 -( b + W - Xe)2 = -(Xe - W + W - Xe)2 = -( 4Xe + Po + W - Xe)2 = 0. For
W = -Xe - Po 1 -(b + W - Xe)2 = - (  4Xe + Po - Xe - Po - Xe)2 = - (Po - Xe - Po - Xe)2 =
-(Po + W - Xe)2 = -4x� . For W = Xe - Po 1 -(Po + W - Xe)2 = - (Po + Xe - Po - Xe)2 =
-(Xe - w + w - Xe)2 = -(b + w - Xe)2 = 0. Thus, given p•( - ) ,  b*(w) is optimal.
Condition (iii) requires that for consistency it must be the case that g*(b) = {wlb =
b•(w)} . Substitution yields w = g• [b*(w)] .
(b) For w E (�, -3Xe - p0] and w E [xe - p0, OJ, x = Xe, which is contained in (0, xc] .
For w E (-Po - Xe, Xe - Po] ,  x = Po +  w, which is contained in (0, Xe] for w 2: -Po·
(c) Since x = Xe for w E (�, -3xc - Po] and w E (xe - Po , OJ,
Eu1 = rJX
e-Po -(xe)2f(w) dw + 1-Xe-Po -(4xe + Po +  w)f(w) dw 
}!!.. -3xe-P• 
Similarly, 
+ L:e�:. -(Po + w)2f(w) dw + 1�-
p, 
-(xe)2 f(w) dw 
= -a!( 4xe)3 - x�. 
Eue = -a!( 4xe)3 - k.
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